This question was generated by student Group E in Cold War Rhetoric, an undergraduate course in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh. The question was played for Karl Rove during his visit to a special meeting of the class on March 3, 2008.
In the students’ peer evaluation using a standardized rating rubric, Group E’s question received 16.45 total points (see breakdown of scores to the left); putting the group in fourth position in the question queue. To read student reflections on the encounter, as well as commentary about the students’ follow-up questions and how Rove handled them, scroll down to comments.
3 Comments | 
96. March 6th, 2008 Jack wrote:
When I told my parents that I would have the opportunity to question Karl Rove with my class, I was told to “learn to bite [my] tongue” so I did not embarrass myself in front of him. Expecting the worst, I practiced daily before the event. As the event was happening, I found myself not wanting to yell at him, but rather wanting to force him to clearly understand the questions that were being asked.
The question we asked referenced the 2003 plan for nuclear disarmament Iran proposed that the United States ignored. We wanted to know why this plan was ignored, especially considering the fact that the Bush Administration has been trying to use Iran’s nuclear capabilities as a deal breaker in any proposed negotiations. From my perspective, he avoided this aspect of the question.
Rove answered the question not referencing the 2003 deal, but instead how we would not agree to negotiate with Iran now because of their potential nuclear power. He said that America would not negotiate with Iran because they were attempting to enrich uranium and trying to make a nuclear weapon. Rove said that negotiating with Iran without preconditions would mean that American would have to agree to certain things which would look like America lost something in the negotiations.
The 2003 proposal from Iran could be seen as a last ditch effort by the Iranian government to work positively with the American government towards some kind of peace deal. According to Gareth Porter of IPS News, the Iranian proposal included very large compromises with regards to its nuclear program, as well as support for a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement and a better relationship with the United States. There is nothing here that mentions the United States losing anything in the negotiations. If anything, the United States wins the sense of peace and does not have to give anything up in the process.
In 2003 we were worried about Iraq having weapons of mass destruction. We went so far as to invade the country to prevent Iraq from using these weapons on us or our allies. The invasion took place under false pretenses, but the United States felt the threat was large enough to take action.
We were given the opportunity to ensure that another country did not and would not get a nuclear weapon, and we threw that opportunity away. Any idea of a possible war could have been avoided by the negotiations that would have come from the Iranian proposal. Rove did not clearly state why the Bush Administration was so quick to ignore the proposal. The idea of Iran having nuclear capabilities became a major issue, and one that threatened war, but this proposal could have seemingly prevented all of that.
There were many times during his answers to our questions where I found myself agreeing with what Rove said. Many times he seemed very candid, and I thought he was giving us the truth rather than something he wanted us to believe. This was one of the times where I felt his answers change into the standard Bush surrogate answer rather than giving information behind the decision. Instead of focusing on 2003, he spent his answer trying to convince us that Iran is a dangerous force and should be immediately, and perhaps, militarily dealt with. Knowing about the rejection of the 2003 proposal and the NIE Report, his answer felt like a desperate attempt to once again “sabre rattle” towards Iran. Rove should have realized his audience was a group of students who have studied the Cold War and have studied the repercussions of not negotiating with enemies, and not the typical American audience.
99. March 6th, 2008 Jill wrote:
On Monday, March 3, 2008, our Rhetoric of the Cold War class had the opportunity to ask former White House appointee, Karl Rove, a few questions that tapped into his expertise of Cold War history. Karl Rove is known to be a highly intelligent man that can pull up great sums of knowledge and precise facts on just about any subject in a matter of seconds. While his lecture at night to a larger audience went smoothly, it was also perceived as an uncontroversial speech from a man shrouded in controversy. The March 4, 2008 edition of the Pitt News (our campus newspaper) stated that he challenged “his questioners to produce evidence backing their allegations.” During our special lecture, the class did just that as we provided great evidence within every question, including our follow-ups. Mr. Rove proved to be the great orator that many know him to be. It should be noted, however, that although Mr. Rove approved this exercise, he did not allow taping of any kind to be taken and this way of tightly controlling the information given somewhat limits us as students.
Our class was divided into six groups that each asked him one question. Group E’s question to Mr. Rove was interesting and received an even more interesting answer. The question asked, “The United States was unwilling to appeal to the demands of the Gromyko Plan, drafted in 1946. The plan called for nuclear disarmament and decommission of the nuclear stockpile before negotiations. Why would the U.S. refuse Iran’s offer to conduct negotiations in 2003 until they stop their nuclear enrichment program, when the U.S. was unwilling to make the same compromise?” With some difficulty in the understanding of the question, Mr. Rove proceeded to answer the question by stating that a sit-down with Iran would legitimize their violations of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) protocol. He emphasized that the United States has deepened sanctions on Iran to further restrict their actions and said that since 1979, U.S. companies will not do business in Iran. Then he got into the Persian culture, saying that the country is deeply polarized in wealth and that many people in Iran own satellite dishes, giving them access to and enjoying American television; in fact, the number one city Persians rely on for TV is Los Angeles, he stated. He went on to say that a large part of Iran’s culture is comprised of younger adults and that they question their own President for hating the country of the culture that they love.
Whether Mr. Rove could not hear the question properly or he simply skirted around the issue is not clear but what was apparent was the fact that his answer left many in the group puzzled. The group asked the question to get a better understanding of why the proposal was left untouched or even ignored. Many see this as Iran’s last ditch effort to keep open lines of communication with the U.S. and the group wanted to receive an answer appropriate to the level of the question asked. While our class’s lecture was resourceful, Mr. Rove did get noticeably flustered while answering more demanding questions and stumbled in areas he did not know well. Regarding the answer, I had my doubts so, with some help, researched the question further. It is true that in 2003, Iran, in plain text, laid everything out on the table – “including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.” With the already publicized war in Iraq, why wouldn’t the U.S. take advantage of this situation with supposed threat Iran? The U.S. was strong and Iran had not even developed a nuclear program in 2003: “At the time, the Iranians were not spinning centrifuges, they were not enriching uranium,” said Flynt Leverett, a senior director on the NSC. So, if we weren’t clear the first time, Mr. Rove, with this genuine and serious effort put forth by the Iranian government, why wouldn’t the U.S. talk with Iran in 2003?
102. March 6th, 2008 ctm wrote:
The students within the assembly room felt a mixture of excitement and nervousness before Karl Rove’s imminent arrival. The questions were prepared, but the reception of the questions remained unknown. To my personal satisfaction a candid and interested Karl Rove arrived. He seemed genuinely happy to field our eclectic questions that compared Cold War themes to the modern era. In my opinion he adequately attempted to provide relevant and poignant answers to each of the questions posed.
During the discussion my group asked, “Why would the US refuse Iran’s offer to conduct negotiations in 2003 until they stop their nuclear enrichment program when the US was unwilling to make the same compromise?” His response was short and concise. Rove stated that negotiations were not an option because Iran was conducting actions that were in violation of International Agreement. He stated that the United States did not want to sit down with Iran because they were in violation of the IAEA safeguard protocol. He claimed that to negotiate would suggest that the actions of the Iranian Government were acceptable. He vehemently argued that the Iranian’s enrichment program was not for energy purposes through their refusal of Russian assistance to construct and maintain a nuclear energy facility.
He suggested that to negotiate without stipulations would prove empowering for Iran’s Government and could prove pointless. He asserted that the leadership in Iran remains untrustworthy. He repeatedly stated, “President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a nut.” He claimed that the word of the Iranian Government should carry little weight in their offer to negotiate in 2003. Karl Rove’s answer was emphatic as he continually said that negotiations with Iran could not occur until they ceased their nuclear enrichment program.
During his response Karl Rove neglected to comment on the historical comparison of the question. My group compared the situation to the actions of the US after the release of the Gromyko plan in 1946. He did not respond to our allegations that the United States was asking Iran to follow a protocol that the US did not abide by in 1946. He did not comment on the comparison of Iran’s refusal to stop their nuclear enrichment program before negotiations and the United States refusal to disarm before negotiations with the Soviet Union. His failure to address this pertinent aspect of our question left me slightly unsatisfied. I believe that the historical reference is significant to better understand the current stalemate between the United States and Iran. Additionally, it suggests a perception that the United States is allowed to govern itself by its own set of rules.
Furthermore, he failed to discuss the question from an Iranian perspective. He clearly stated that the United States would not negotiate, but he did not discuss what purpose Iran had to continue their nuclear program. Also, he strongly stated that negotiations would empower them, but he did not exercise the possibility that negotiations could potentially lead to the end of the Iranian nuclear program.