Words of Estimative Probability in the New Iran NIE

Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell released yesterday the summary of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessing Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities.

Since key judgments in the report are in tension with several of the Bush administration’s key premises underlying its bellicose Iran policy, release of the new NIE is igniting the first major public argument between political leaders and the Intelligence Community (IC) since IC reorganization in 2004.

National Intelligence Council (NIC) chief Thomas Fingar is sure to emerge as a key player in the ensuing controversy. Fingar, who chaired the group of 16 intelligence agencies contributing to the NIE, is no stranger to weighty intelligence disputes. Prior to the Iraq war, he held senior positions in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the one intelligence shop that when it came to assessments of Saddam Hussein’s unconventional weaponry, got it right.

Now as head of the NIC, Fingar has taken the wise approach of controlling the dicey debate over interpretation of Iran intelligence by defining terms at the outset. Page 5 of the new NIE carries an remarkable text box that deploys analogy, metaphor, and graphical representations to help audiences interpret the precise meaning of words used in the estimate.

We see this as a very welcome contribution to public discourse, one that jibes with a key recommendation from Hitting First:

With release of the NIE, the public argument over Iran policy has suddenly gotten red hot, with key neoconservatives Norman Podhoretz and Michael Ledeen issuing quick attacks on the credibility of the U.S. intelligence community. As the dispute unfolds, it will be crucial for commentators, citizens and policy-makers to remember the NIE text box on page 5, which not only works as a map to help decode contents of the estimate, but also hints at useful lines of questioning and analysis:

• Now that the NIC has put its chips down and clarified its terms, advocates of preventively bombing Iran should be called upon to do the same. If their data are not coming from the 16 U.S. intelligence entities, where are they coming from, and have they been validated by at least some form of rigorous intelligence analysis? What are the degrees of uncertainty underlying the claims, and what are the confidence levels in their alternative, Team B assessments?
• Fingar and McConnell have implemented many of the intelligence reform measures recommended by multiple bipartisan panels (including Silberman-Robb’s call for more precision regarding words of estimative probability). When bomb Iran advocates such as Podhoretz and Ledeen savage the credibility of the IC, are they taking into account the possibility that these reforms may have improved the intelligence product since 2004 (not to mention the fact that Fingar got the Iraq intelligence right; no doubt one of the reasons for his promotion to NIC Chair).
• The Hadley problem. Traditionally, the president’s National Security Advisor has played the crucial role of making sure the president’s public statements align with coordinated intelligence assessments. If Hadley knew about contents of the new Iran NIE and did nothing for months to rein in President Bush’s bellicose saber-rattling about “World War III” and Iran’s nuclear program, such a careless and reckless oversight would seem to be sufficient grounds for dismissal.